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Abstract
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem is an extension of the standard Nash
equilibrium problem where both the utility function and the strategy space of each
player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players. Recently, the generalized
Nash equilibrium problem has emerged as an eﬀective and powerful tool for
modeling a wide class of problems arising in many ﬁelds and yet solution algorithms
are extremely scarce. In this paper, using a regularized Nikaido-Isoda function, we
reformulate the generalized Nash equilibrium problem as a mathematical program
with complementarity constraints (MPCC). We then propose a suitable method for
this MPCC and under some conditions, we establish the convergence of the
proposed method by showing that any accumulation point of the generated
sequence is a M-stationary point of the MPCC. Numerical results on some generalized
Nash equilibrium problems are reported to illustrate the behavior of our approach.
Keywords: standard Nash equilibrium problem; generalized Nash equilibrium
problem; normalized Nash equilibrium; Nikaido-Isoda function; M-stationary point
1 Introduction
This paper considers the generalized Nash equilibrium problem with jointly convex con-
straints (GNEP). To be more speciﬁc, let us now give formal deﬁnitions of the stan-
dard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) and the GNEP. We assume there are N players,
each player ν ∈ {, . . . ,N} controls the variables xν ∈ nν and x = (x, . . . ,xN )T ∈ n with
n = n + · · · + nN denotes the vector comprised of all these decision variables. To empha-
size the νth player’s variables within the vector x, we sometimes write x = (xν ,x–ν)T , where
x–ν subsumes all the other players’ variables. We will also write n–ν = n – nν . Moreover,
for both NEPs and GNEPs, let θν : n →  be the νth player’s payoﬀ (or loss or utility)
function.





be the Cartesian product of the strategy sets of all players, then a vector x∗ ∈ X is called a
Nash equilibrium, or a solution of the NEP, if each block component x∗,ν is a solution of
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s.t. xν ∈ Xν ,
i.e., x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his situation by unilaterally changing
his strategy.
On the other hand, in a GNEP, there is a common strategy set X ⊆ n for all players, and
a vector x∗ = (x∗,, . . . ,x∗,N )T ∈ n is called a generalized Nash equilibrium or a solution of











If X has the Cartesian product structure as (.), then a GNEP reduces to a NEP. Through-
out this paper, we assume that X can be represented as
X =
{
x ∈ n | g(x)≤ } (.)
for some functions g :n → m. Note that usually, a player ν might have some additional
constraints of the form hν(xν) ≤  depending on his decision variables only. However,
these additional constraints can be viewed as part of the joint constraints g(x) ≤ , with
some of the component functions gi of g depending on the block component xν of x only.
So, we include these latter constraints in the former ones.
The GNEP was formally introduced by Debreu [] as early as , but it is only from
themid-s that the GNEP attractedmuch attention because of its capability of model-
ing a number of interesting problems in economy, computer science, telecommunications
and deregulated markets (for example, see [–]). Motivated by the fact that a NEP can
be reformulated as a variational inequality problem (VI); see, for example, [, ], Harker
[] characterized the GNEP as a quasi-variational inequality (QVI). But unlike VI, there
are few eﬃcient methods for solving QVI, and therefore such a reformulation is not used
widely in designing implementable algorithms. The idea of using an exact penalty ap-
proach to the GNEP was proposed by Facchinei and Pang [] and Facchinei and Kanzow
[], but the disadvantage of this method is that a nondiﬀerentiable NEP has to be solved
to obtain a generalized Nash equilibrium.
Another approach for solving the GNEP is based on the Nikaido-Isoda function. Relax-
ation methods and proximal-like methods using the Nikaido-Isoda function are investi-
gated in [–]. A regularized version of the Nikaido-Isoda function was ﬁrst introduced
in [] for NEPs then further investigated by Heusinger and Kanzow [], they reformu-
lated the GNEP as a constrained optimization problem with continuously diﬀerentiable
objective function.
Motivated by [], in this paper, we further reformulate theGNEP as aMPCC.Moreover,
we propose a smoothingmethod to this problem and give some suitable conditions for the
convergence of the proposed method. The organization of the paper is as follows. In the
next section, we recall some preliminaries and basic facts and deﬁnitions. In Section , we
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give details of our optimization reformulation of the GNEP and discuss the convergence
properties of our method. Finally, in Section , we present some numerical results.
We use the following notations throughout the paper. For a diﬀerentiable function
g : n → m, the Jacobian of g at x ∈ n is denoted by J g(x), and it is transposed by
∇g(x). Given a diﬀerentiable function  : n → , the symbol ∇xν(x) denotes the par-
tial gradient with respect to xν-part only. For a function f :n × n → , f (x, ·) :n → 
denotes the functionwith x being ﬁxed. For vectors x, y ∈ n, 〈x, y〉 denotes the inner prod-
uct deﬁned by 〈x, y〉 := xTy and x ⊥ y means 〈x, y〉 = . Finally, throughout the paper, ‖ · ‖
denotes the Euclidean vector norm.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we make the following blanket assumptions.
Assumption .
(i) The utility functions θν are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and as a function of xν
along, θν are convex.
(ii) The function g is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, its components gi are convex
(in x), and the corresponding strategy space X deﬁned by (.) is nonempty.
Note that the convexity assumptions are absolutely standard setting under which the
GNEP is usually investigated in the literature, and Assumption .(ii) implies that the
strategy set X ⊆ n is nonempty, closed, and convex. An important tool for both NEPs














In particular, the NI function provides an important subset of all the solutions of a GNEP.








However, the supremum in (.) may not be attained, or it may be attained at more than
one point. In order to overcome these disadvantages, in [] authors provided a regular-
ized version of the NI function. Let α >  be a given parameter that is assumed to be ﬁxed
throughout this paper. The regularized NI function is given by
α(x, y) :=(x, y) –
α
 ‖x – y‖
.
We now deﬁne the corresponding value function by





where yα(x) denotes the unique solution of the uniformly concave maximization problem
maxα(x, y)
s.t. y ∈ X.
(.)
Lai et al. Journal of Inequalities and Applications  (2015) 2015:90 Page 4 of 16
As noted in [], the function Vα is continuously diﬀerentiable with gradient given by
∇Vα(x) =∇xα(x, y)|y=yα (x),
and x∗ is a normalizedNash equilibriumof theGNEP if and only if it solves the constrained
optimization problem
minVα(x)
s.t. x ∈ X
(.)
with optimal function value Vα(x∗) = .
3 Problem reformulation and a smoothingmethod
We now use the regularized NI function in order to obtain a MPCC reformulation of the
GNEP.
Based on (.), x∗ is a normalized Nash equilibrium of the GNEP if and only if x∗ solves





s.t. yα(x) = arg maxy∈X α(x, y), (.)
x ∈ X.
We consider Problem (.). For every x ∈ X, let the linear independence constraint qual-
iﬁcation (LICQ) hold at yα(x), then by Assumption ., yα(x) is a solution of (.) if and












where λα(x) is a Lagrangian multiplier. Thus, Problem (.) is equivalent to
minα(x, y)
s.t. ∇yα(x, y) –∇g(y)λ = ,
g(x)≤ ,
≤ λ ⊥ –g(y)≥ .
(.)
This problem is a MPCC.
Now, we can easily get the following result as regards the normalized Nash equilibrium
of the GNEP and the solution of the MPCC.
Proposition . For every x ∈ X, let the LICQ hold at yα(x), then x∗ is a normalized Nash
equilibrium if and only if there exists a vector (y∗,λ∗) such that (x∗, y∗,λ∗) is a solution of
Problem (.).
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Let z = (x, y,λ), f (z) = α(x, y), h(z) = ∇yα(x, y) – ∇g(y)λ, g¯(z) = g(x), G(z) = λ, and
H(z) = –g(y), we rewrite (.) more compactly as
min f (z)









= f (z) + h(z)Tμ + g¯(z)Tη –G(z)TξG –H(z)TξH
and the index sets of active constraints as
Ig¯(z) =
{




i |Gi(z) = 
}
, IH (z) =
{
i |Hi(z) = 
}
,
the MPCC-LICQ for (.) at a feasible point z¯ says that the following vectors:
∇hi(z¯), i = , . . . ,n, ∇ g¯i(z¯), i ∈ Ig¯(z¯),
∇Gi(z¯), i ∈ IG(z¯), ∇Hi(z¯), i ∈ IH (z¯)
are linearly independent.
We next consider two simple GNEPs which show that the MPCC-LICQ for (.) holds
at a solution z∗.
Example . Consider the GNEP with N = , X = {x ∈  | x ≥ ,x ≥ }, and payoﬀ
functions θ (x) = xx and θ(x) = x. Now let us consider yα(x), the unique solution of
max
(








s.t. y ∈ X.






























α +  – αx
)}
.
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We see that x∗ = (, ) is the normalized Nash equilibrium and z∗ = (, , , , , ) is a solu-






























= (, , , , , )T .
Moreover, we can see ∇hi(z∗), i = , , ∇ g¯i(z∗), i = , , ∇Hi(z∗), i = , , are linearly inde-
pendent, hence the MPCC-LICQ holds at z∗.
Example . Consider the GNEP with two players:
minxx
s.t. x ≥ ,
x ≥ ,
x + x ≤ ,
min–xx
s.t. x ≥ ,
x ≥ ,
x + x ≤ .
The regularized NI function is









and X = {x |  – x ≤ ,  – x ≤ ,x + x –  ≤ }. It can be seen that x∗ = (, ) is the
unique normalized Nash equilibrium and
z∗ =
(
x,∗,x,∗, y,∗α , y,∗α ,λ,∗α ,λ,∗α ,λ,∗α
)
= (, , , , , , )



































= (, , , , , , )T .
Obviously, ∇hi(z∗), i = , , ∇ g¯i(z∗), i = , , ∇Hi(z∗), i = , , ∇Gi(z∗), i = , are linearly
independent, hence the MPCC-LICQ for (.) holds at z∗.
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In the study of MPCCs, there are several kinds of stationarity deﬁned for Problem (.).
Deﬁnition .
() A feasible point z¯ of (.) is called a critical point if there exist multipliers μ¯, η¯, ξ¯G,
and ξ¯H such that
∇zL
(
z¯, μ¯, η¯, ξ¯G, ξ¯H
)
= ,
η¯ ≥ , η¯T g¯(z¯) = ,
ξ¯Gi = , if i /∈ IG(z¯),
ξ¯Hi = , if i /∈ IH (z¯).
(.)
() Clarke (C)-stationarity: η¯i ≥  and ξ¯Gk ξ¯Hk ≥  for all k ∈ IG(z¯)∩ IH (z¯).
() Mordukhovich (M)-stationarity: η¯i ≥  and either ξ¯Gk , ξ¯Hk >  or ξ¯Gk ξ¯Hk =  for all
k ∈ IG(z¯)∩ IH (z¯).
We now propose our smoothing method for (.). This method is similar to one given
in [] which, however, uses a diﬀerent reformulation of the complementarity constraints.
Let
φ(a,b, 
) = a + b –
√
(a – b) + 
.
and 
 >  is the smoothing parameter. We have
φ(a,b, 





) =  –
a – b√





) =  –
b – a√
























[(a – b) + 
] 
.
By the deﬁnition of the function φ and the calculation formulas for its ﬁrst- and second-
order partial derivatives, we can easily obtain the following properties of φ.
Lemma . Let (a,b, 
) satisfy φ(a,b, 




∂aφ(a,b, ) = , if a >  = b,
∂
∂bφ(a,b, ) = , if a =  < b.
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(ii) Let (ak ,bk)→ (, ) as 
k → + with φ(ak ,bk , 




∂aφ(ak ,bk , 
k)
∂
∂bφ(ak ,bk , 
k)








)T → –∞, as k → ∞,
where Vk = ( ∂φ
∂b , –
∂φ
∂a ) and Hk is the Hessian of φ with respect to a and b evaluated at
(ak ,bk , 
k).
Now, we consider the following problem with 
 > :
min f (z)






(z) = (φ(G(z),H(z), 
), . . . ,φ(Gm(z),Hm(z), 
))T . We recall that z
 is stationary
for (.) if it is feasible and there exist Lagrangian multiplier vectors μ
 ∈ n, η
 ∈ m,
and ξ 




















) ≤ , η










where the Lagrangian function is
L(z,μ,η, ξ ) = f (z) + h(z)Tμ + g¯(z)Tη +
(z)Tξ .
A stationary point z
 with Lagrangian multipliers μ
 , η
 , ξ 
 of (.) is said to satisfy a























)Td = , i = , . . . ,n
∇
i (z
)Td = , i = , . . . ,m
∇ g¯i(z
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We need a slightly weaker condition that we call the weak second-order necessary condi-
tion (WSONC), which requires the positive semideﬁniteness of ∇zzL(z
 ,μ
 ,η















)Td = , i = , . . . ,n
∇
i (z
)Td = , i = , . . . ,m
∇ g¯i(z






Now, we state a convergence result for the smoothing method (.).
Theorem . Let {zk ,μk ,ηk , ξ k} be a Karush-Kuhn-Tucher (KKT) point of (.) for each

 = 
k , where 
k → +. Suppose that z¯ is a limit point of {zk} and the MPCC-LICQ holds at
z¯ for (.). Then
(i) z¯ is a C-stationary point of (.);
(ii) if WSONC holds for (.) at each zk , then z¯ is a M-stationary point of (.).
Proof By taking a subsequence if necessary, we assume that zk → z¯, and it is easy to see





















































































First, we show that z¯ is a critical point of (.). The gradient equation of the KKT system
for (.) at zk is



















































































Let rki = ξ ki
∂φi
∂a and vki = ξ ki
∂φi
∂b , we show that limk→∞ rki exists and rki →  if i /∈ IG(z¯). Let
i /∈ IG(z¯), then i ∈ IH (z¯) by the feasibility of z¯. We assume that there exist a positive number
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α¯ >  and a subsequence (we denote the subsequence by the sequence itself for the sake























then limk→∞ |ξ ki | = +∞. Let βk := ‖(μk ,ηk , ξ k)‖, then βk → +∞. It is not diﬃcult to ob-
tain for suﬃciently large k, Ig¯(zk) ⊆ Ig¯(z¯). Dividing (.) by βk , and taking any limit point












v˜i∇Hi(z¯) = . (.)
Equation (.) contradicts the MPCC-LICQ at z¯. Therefore, limk→∞ rki = , for i /∈ IG(z¯).
In the same way, we can also prove that limk→∞ vki = , for i /∈ IH (z¯). Furthermore, {μki }ni=,
{ηki }i∈Ig¯ (z¯), {rki }i∈IG(z¯), and {vki }i∈IH (z¯) are bounded. Otherwise, dividing (.) by βk and tak-
ing the limit will lead to a contradiction to the MPCC-LICQ at z¯ as done above. Due
to the MPCC-LICQ at z¯, Let (μ¯, η¯, r¯, v¯) denote the unique limit of (μk ,ηk , rk , vk), with
rk = (rk , . . . , rkm)T and vk = (vk , . . . , vkm)T , we can see, (z¯, μ¯, η¯, r¯, v¯) satisﬁes (.), so, z¯ is a
critical point of (.).
























the C-stationarity of z¯ follows.
For the M-stationarity of z¯. If z¯ is not a M-stationary point of (.) which means that
there exists at least one index, denoted by l ∈ IG(z¯) ∩ IH (z¯) such that r¯l >  and v¯l > , so

















Second, by the MPCC-LICQ at z¯, we have
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
∇hi(z¯)T , i = , . . . ,n
∇ g¯i(z¯)T , i ∈ Ig¯(z¯)
∇Gi(z¯)T , i ∈ IG(z¯)
∇Hi(z¯)T , i ∈ IH (z¯)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
has full row rank. Then for suﬃciently large k,
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∇hi(zk)T , i = , . . . ,n
∇ g¯i(zk)T , i ∈ Ig¯(z¯)
∇Gi(zk)T , i ∈ IG(z¯)\{l}
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which tends to –∞ by Lemma .. This contradicts that zk satisﬁes WSONC. The M-sta-
tionarity of z¯ follows. 
4 Numerical experiments
We have tested the method on various examples of the GNEP. We applied MATLAB .
built-in solver function fmincon to solve the nonlinear programs for positive 
-values.
The computational results are summarized in Tables , , -, , which indicate that the
proposed method produces good approximate solutions.
Example . This problem is taken from []. There are two players, each player ν has a












s.t. x + x ≤ .
This problem has inﬁnitely many solutions {(α,  – α) | α ∈ [., ]}, but has only one nor-
malizedNash equilibriumat x¯ = (  ,

 )T . Table  is for the corresponding numerical results.
Example . This is a duopoly model with two players taken from []. Each player ν







+ λ – d
)
for ν = , ,
and the constraints are given by
–≤ xν ≤  for ν = , ,
where d = , λ = , ρ¯ = .
Example . This example is a river basin pollution game also taken from []. There are




cν + cνxν – d + d
(
x + x + x
))
Table 1 Numerical results for Example 4.1
 x1 x2 α(x,y)
1e–1 0.749996 0.250004 0.045135
1e–5 0.749997 0.250003 4.999308e–006
1e–8 0.750000 0.250000 4.336026e–009
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Table 2 Numerical results for Example 4.2
 x1 x2 α(x,y)
1e–1 5.333334 5.333333 1.848689e–005
1e–5 5.333333 5.333333 1.851667e–009
1e–8 5.333334 5.333331 1.067513e–012
Table 3 Values of constants for Example 4.3
Player ν c1,ν c2,ν eν μν,1 μν,2
1 0.10 0.01 0.50 6.5 4.583
2 0.12 0.05 0.25 5.0 6.250
3 0.15 0.01 0.75 5.5 3.750
Table 4 Numerical results for Example 4.3
 x1 x2 x3 α(x,y)
1e–1 21.148268 16.029412 2.722755 0.050083
1e–5 21.142311 16.026439 2.728349 5.000023e–004
1e–8 21.143711 16.029660 2.726270 3.893246e–008
Table 5 Numerical results for Example 4.4
 x1 x2 x3 α(x,y)
1e–1 0.090697 0.090697 0.090697 8.776339e–005
1e–5 0.089987 0.089987 0.089987 2.147441e–006
1e–8 0.090001 0.090001 0.090001 5.020587e–010
for ν = , , , and the constraints are
μex +μex +μex ≤ K, μex +μex +μex ≤ K.
The economic constants d and d determine the inverse demand law and set to . and
., respectively. Values for constants c,ν , c,ν , eν , μν,, and μν, are given in Table , and
K = K = .
Example . This test problem is an Internet switching model introduced by Kesselman








with constraints xν ≥ ., ν = , . . . ,N , and ∑Nν= xν ≤ B. We set N = , B = . The ex-
act solution of this problem is x∗ = (., ., . . . , .)T . We only state the ﬁrst three
components of x in Table .
Example . Let us consider the following GNEP. There are two players in the game,
where player  controls a two-dimensional variable x = (x,x)T ∈  and player  controls
a one-dimensional variable x = x ∈ . The problem is
min
x,x
x + xx + x + (x + x)x – x – x
s.t. x,x ≥ ,
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Table 6 Numerical results for Example 4.5
 x1 x2 x3 α(x,y)
1e–1 0.026144 10.972252 7.972330 0.121529
1e–5 0.000640 10.999360 7.999360 1.133698e–005
1e–8 0.000026 10.999974 7.999974 1.252339e–008
1e–10 0.000007 10.999993 7.999993 2.532424e–009
Table 7 Values of constants for Example 4.6
Player ν 1 2 3 4 5 6
ci 0.04 0.035 0.125 0.0166 0.05 0.05
di 2 1.75 1 3.25 3 3
ei 0 0 0 0 0 0
x + x – x ≤ ,
x + x + x ≤ ,
min
x
x + (x + x)x – x
s.t. x ≥ ,
x + x – x ≤ ,
x + x + x ≤ .
The problem has inﬁnitely many solutions given by
{
(α,  – α,  – α) | α ∈ [, ]},
but it has only one normalized Nash equilibrium at α = .
Example . This GNEP from [] is the electricity market problem. This model has
three players, player  controls a single variable x ∈ , player  controls a two-dimensional





)T = (x,x,x,x,x,x)T .
The utility functions are given by




 + dx + e
)
,






i + dixi + ei
)
,






i + dixi + ei
)
,
where ψ(x) = (x + · · · + x) – . and the constants ci, di, ei are given in Table .
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Table 8 Numerical results for Example 4.6
 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 α(x,y)
1e–1 46.661555 32.156981 15.000217 22.126220 12.328712 12.331506 1.158639e–006
1e–3 46.661654 32.148613 15.008479 22.092360 12.354163 12.339830 4.165322e–007
1e–5 46.661522 32.159056 14.999815 22.010223 12.366374 12.338851 2.523263e–007
The constraints are
≤ x ≤ , ≤ x ≤ , ≤ x ≤ ,
≤ x ≤ , ≤ x ≤ , ≤ x ≤ .
Table  is for the corresponding numerical results.
The numerical experiments show that the method proposed in this paper is imple-
mentable for solving GNEPs with jointly convex constraints.
5 Remarks
The main idea of this paper is to try use a smoothing method to solve the GNEP. Based
on the regularized Nikaido-Isoda function, we reformulate the set of normalized Nash
equilibria, which is a subset of the generalized Nash equilibria, as solutions of a MPCC
and we solve the MPCC by a smoothing method. There are some problems as regards the
smoothing method worth further investigating:
(i) In this paper, some conditions are given to establish the convergence of the
smoothing method by showing that any accumulation point of the generated
sequence is a M-stationary point of the MPCC. For the next step, less strict
assumptions than Theorem . to obtain the results of Theorem . are worth
considering.
(ii) Based on the special structure of the MPCC deﬁned in (.), can we derive
convergence results tailored to the GNEP, which may possibly be stronger than
those known for the MPCC? This problem is worth studying.
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